This is a MapMyTimes opinion piece on the Securities and Exchange Board of India's (SEBI) consultation paper, issued in Mumbai on 20 November 2026, that proposes tighter age and tenure limits for the people who run and oversee India's stock exchanges, clearing corporations and depositories, known together as market infrastructure institutions (MIIs). MapMyTimes reported the details when the paper came out. Our view: the direction is right, and the final rules should keep their spine.

What is SEBI proposing?

SEBI is proposing hard ceilings on how long any one person can lead or police these institutions. According to the paper, a managing director (MD) could serve no single term above five years, no more than eight years at one MII and no more than 12 years across MIIs. Today an MD can serve ten years at one institution and then ten more at another, with no overall limit. Public interest directors (PIDs), who sit on boards in what SEBI calls a "quasi-regulatory" role, would face a maximum age of 70 instead of 75 and a cap of two three-year terms instead of three. A PID could sit on at most four of the six statutory committees, and the bar on holding directorships in connected entities would extend from subsidiaries to associates.

Why does tenure matter for an exchange?

Tenure matters because exchanges and depositories are not ordinary companies; they are the first line of regulation. SEBI's paper notes that MIIs frame and enforce rules for their members and that the regulator relies on them to catch problems first. When one person heads such an institution for very long, or moves from one to another in succession, the paper warns of "key man risk" and entrenchment that "weakens the checks exercised by the board and by SEBI". Because exchanges, clearing houses and depositories are linked through settlement and data, a single long-serving leader can carry disproportionate influence across the whole system. A known end date also makes it easier for an executive to take unpopular decisions without worrying about the next renewal.

Closing the associate-company loophole is equally sensible. SEBI itself says a restriction limited to subsidiaries can be sidestepped simply by putting an activity in an associate instead. Rules that can be structured around are not really rules.

What is the strongest case against?

The best counter-argument is that the talent pool is thin. Running a clearing corporation or a depository needs rare technical and risk-management experience, and a hard 12-year ceiling could push out a capable leader at the peak of their usefulness, while a lower age limit for PIDs could exclude experienced former judges, regulators and administrators. Frequent turnover also brings its own risk: new leaders need time to learn complex systems, and transitions can be moments of weakness.

These concerns deserve a serious hearing, but they argue for careful succession planning, not for open-ended tenures. SEBI has already softened the transition: sitting MDs would get a 15-year ceiling across MIIs, and serving office-holders would finish their current terms. Eight years at one institution is still a long innings. The deeper answer to a thin bench is to grow one, through a stronger pipeline of executive directors, which the proposed separate limits for EDs appear designed to encourage.

What should happen next?

Comments are open until 11 December 2026. Exchanges, depositories, investors and former directors should engage with specifics, especially on whether 70 is the right age bar for PIDs and whether the transition rules are fair. SEBI, in turn, should publish a summary of the feedback and its reasons for any changes. The aim should be simple: institutions that outlast their leaders, and boards that answer to the market rather than to any one person.

Photo source · Appaiah, CC BY-SA 2.0